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Encyclopedia Britannica to Shut Down Print Operations

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Support Michael Sporn’s Film about Edgar Allen Poe

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The Early History of Modern Computing: A Brief Chronology

Computing Encounters Being, an Addendum

On the Origin of Objects (towards a philosophy of computation)

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Wednesday, October 24, 2007

Lorem Ipsum vs. Gregory Currie

Posted by John Holbo on 10/24/07 at 03:44 AM

Tomorrow in my ‘philosophy and literature’ seminar we’re discussing Gregory Currie, “Work and Text” (Mind, vol. 100, 3; 1991; 325-340). It’s a bit picky-picky, analytic style - and contains, to boot, a thought-experiment that would get up John Emerson’s nose. A variant on good old Pierre Menard rewriting Quixote: what if, due to some quantum, gothodynamic miracle, Anne Radcliffe has written Northhanger Abbey ten years before Jane Austen independently reproduced it? Same words, different ... something. Different work, Currie will say. Because from Radcliffe it is ‘straight’ gothic, not ironic. But never mind about that case, especially if you don’t like. I was struck by how Currie starts out by asserting as obvious something that - in my “Form, Function and Intention” draft - I quoted Ruth Millikan as asserting as obvious; but which is pretty obviously false, seems to me. (I’m not sure it’s important, but I keep running into philosophers saying what seems to me clearly the wrong thing. So maybe it’s worth correcting.)

The claim is this. Millikan: “We classify word tokens into types in several ways but never by reference to physical form (sound, shape) alone. For example, neither “the word ‘seal’” nor “the English word ‘seal’” unambiguously describes a unique language-device type. Under any normal interpretations there are several English words ‘seal.’”

Now Currie:

Much will be said further on about distinct works which have the same text. [Pierre Menard-authoring-Quixote, or Radcliffe-anticipating-Austen cases.] But what decides whether we are dealing with one text or two? Equivalently, what decides whether these two text-tokens are tokens of the same text-type? I offer as a sufficient condition that the two tokens have the same semantic and syntactic properties. (Roughly, they should consist of words, in the same order, that mean the same thing and are spelled the same way).’ Whether these conditions are also necessary for textual sameness need not worry us, as the examples I shall use will satisfy the conditions offered as sufficient.

He adds a footnote that reads, in part:

Thus “die” is one word in English, another in German, by my reckoning. Is “museum” one word in English, another (disregarding capitalization) in German? They have the same spelling and, I assume, the same meaning. Perhaps they differ in their relational semantic properties, in which case we can count them different.

Anyway, the obvious counter-example (the one I deploy against Millikan in my draft) is the typographic sense of ‘text’, or ‘word’ - which I call the ‘lorem ipsum’ sense. Take a classic block of dummy text:

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipisicing elit, sed do eiusmod tempor incididunt ut labore et dolore magna aliqua. Ut enim ad minim veniam, quis nostrud exercitation ullamco laboris nisi ut aliquip ex ea commodo consequat. Duis aute irure dolor in reprehenderit in voluptate velit esse cillum dolore eu fugiat nulla pariatur. Excepteur sint occaecat cupidatat non proident, sunt in culpa qui officia deserunt mollit anim id est laborum.

Now, we hop over to the lorem ipsum generator and brew up something fresher.

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetuer adipiscing elit. Fusce vulputate malesuada turpis. Class aptent taciti sociosqu ad litora torquent per conubia nostra, per inceptos hymenaeos. Vivamus ac dolor non velit mollis vulputate. Ut sed nisi sed leo eleifend gravida. Phasellus tortor sapien, vulputate facilisis, tincidunt et, bibendum sed, neque. Suspendisse dolor tortor, pellentesque nec, malesuada at, imperdiet a, nisl. Phasellus volutpat tincidunt lacus. Pellentesque habitant morbi tristique senectus et netus et malesuada fames ac turpis egestas. Quisque congue augue in ante. Suspendisse id nibh non magna elementum malesuada. Mauris eget odio.

These count as instances of ‘the same text’, according to Currie. Because 1) they are texts; 2) they have the same semantic and syntactic properties. Namely, none and none. More specifically: they have the same pseudo-semantics, same pseudo-syntax. They are statistically analogous assortments of letters, basically.

(At this point a howl goes up (well, it could.) ‘But Currie said spelled the same! This is true. Really what strikes me is that the thing he says in parentheses, which he says is ‘roughly’ the same as the first thing he says, is NOT roughly the same but quite different. Let me just experimentally ignore the thing in parentheses. I think what we see there is Currie wavering between thinking of ‘text’ in a semantic-syntactic sense and ‘text’ in a typographical sense. I’m happy to give Currie half credit, on account of that parenthesis.)

There seems to be a perfectly good - not entirely clear - sense in which texts are defined by character string identity - lines of letters. This is neither a syntactic nor a semantic notion, because letter is neither a syntactic nor a semantic notion. (Nor is ‘letter order’.) This notion of text is a ‘shape’ concept, very broadly speaking. Letters are shapes. Of course, this is not to say we can define this shape concept. It isn’t a ‘pure’ concept. The property of ‘looking like’ a word is crucial to the whole lorem ipsum business, and ‘looking like’ a shape is not a shape property. Also, awareness that text - letters - normally subserve some syntactic, semantic function bleeds in early and often. The concept of lorem ipsum as text depends on awareness of what normal texts are like, i.e. not like this. Still, the fact that typographers and copy editors don’t have to worry about semantics and syntax, if they want to see just strings of letters, says something. You can take up the typographical stance, as Dennett might say. It’s stable.

Why does this matter? Well, if you are writing a paper entitled “Work and Text”, for Mind, it is the sort of thing you might want to take into consideration. Beyond that, it seems to me something like the following might be worth working out: identity of text is, in the most basement-level sense, a typographical notion (taking ‘typography’ broadly - the shape of the signifier. I’m only picking that word because of the handy lorem ipsum example. Obviously there’s speech, too. There’s lots of stuff.) A string of shape or sound, not a syntax and semantics thing.

Rocketing up several levels, we get to what Currie discusses under the heading of ‘work’ - roughly, the sort of thing that is plausibly different, if Menard is the author, vs. Cervantes. Or Radcliffe, vs. Austen. As Currie says (my typographic objection don’t affect this): these will be cases of same text, different work. This is basically a wind-up to a pitch of origins as essential to identities (which has to do with my Smith case, but we won’t go there just right now, eh?)

What remains to be seen is what sense(s) can be made out between text and work, in these senses. How many tolerably stable intermediate stances are assumable. Working up, there is the level that corresponds to ... to what?

1) Typography plus syntax and semantics? (What Currie calls text.)

2) Then, perhaps, syntax and semantics plus a very minimal sort of intentional background. (What Nabokov calls ‘agent x’ - a basic-level, heuristic, speech-active focus point. As Joyce says, “the artist, like the God of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails.” And if this God did not exist, the reader should be obliged to invent Him.)

3) Finally, syntax and semantics, plus a generic sort of intentional background, plus the full-blooded author with all her intentional states. (Dumbledore is gay! I always thought so!)

The problem with 1) is that, although it can be taken up for artificial languages - chess notation, say. it cannot clearly be taken up for natural languages. There is such a thing as seeing an English sentence AS strings of letters. There is such a thing as seeing English sentences AS the performance of some speech act. Perhaps there isn’t, really, psychologically, anything in between. It’s too much just a cloud of semantic variables. You can’t read a text AS that.

The problem with 2) and 3) is that they hardly come to the same thing. Sorry to noodle around so pedantically and pickily, while lacking a punch line. (I am sure it is due to my abiding analytic philosophy capacity for ‘lack of noticing’.) The punch line I’m casting about for has something to do with what Davidson says at the end of last week’s reading, “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”: “I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed.” What the hell does he mean by that? I’ll try to have an answer by tomorrow morning, when I have to teach this stuff. (Really I’m just talking to myself here. Sorry, sorry. A thousand pardons, dear reader.)


Comments

Not that I necessarily disagree with your conclusions; but you say that you ‘brewed up’ the second lorem ipsum passage.  Did you, though?  Aren’t you actually quoting it?  It’s a specialist sort of quoting, I’d agree; more than just copying the previous words out word-for-word, but still.  You can’t really say that you wrote it ...

By Adam Roberts on 10/24/07 at 01:06 PM | Permanent link to this comment

1), 2), and 3) don’t come to the same thing, but that doesn’t mean they refute each other. In the world as I know it, they all seem to exist in various forms. (For example, a less hoity-toity case of 2) might be a mass-manufactured version of Michelangelo’s “David” in a Florentine tourist shop.) I’m afraid a term like “work” seems to me at least as culturally-dependent and semantically fuzzy as the works themselves.

(Personal aside: Sorry, John, my Poet vs. Philosopher team spirit got the better of me in the tone of that post. I should’ve at least added “in the proud tradition of Thales.")

By Ray Davis on 10/24/07 at 01:33 PM | Permanent link to this comment

"you say that you ‘brewed up’ the second lorem ipsum passage.  Did you, though?  Aren’t you actually quoting it?  It’s a specialist sort of quoting, I’d agree; more than just copying the previous words out word-for-word, but still.  You can’t really say that you wrote it ...”

Well he actually says “we” brewed it up, if you want to be picky. Presumably because it’s shorter than typing out “Hit a button on lipsum.org and copy/paste the results”. In either case he doesn’t claim to have written it.

I don’t know how Holbo could have done something “more” than copying out previously-existing words word-for-word, either. Presumably he used ctrl-c/ctrl-v after highlighting, or maybe right-clicked and hit “copy”. This isn’t more than what normal quotation involves; it’s exactly what normal quotation involves, when there’s a copypastable text in question. (Do Macs have right mouse buttons now? I haven’t used one since grade school, so I have no idea. I don’t even remember if they have a ctrl key. I vaguely recall a “function” key, or something like that.)

Davis: Why would the three levels “refute” one another? They’re aspects, like the duck and the rabbit in the duckrabbit. They can coexist quite amicably, I should have thought. Though as it happens, the 1)-type level doesn’t seem to have any application to natural language. This doesn’t mean that 2 & 3 can’t both be reasonable ways to read something, depending on what you’re looking at a text for. (They seem to be something like sentence meaning and speaker meaning—what I would take a sentence to be saying if I didn’t have much (or any) extra information about its speaker, and what I take a sentence to be saying in ordinary cases where I do have plenty of background information. Holbo is right that these are not the same thing, and it’s possible to forget that.)

(Capcha: pattern59. Capcha can pick up on Dennett references, apparently.)

By Daniel on 10/24/07 at 03:52 PM | Permanent link to this comment

Addendum: It occurs to me that 1) actually does describe something you can do with natural languages. It’s “translation-ese”. Trying to combine semantics (the lexicon) and syntax (the grammar-book) was pretty much how I muddled by way through Greek, before I started to get a feel for the stuff. (Not that I know Greek now, but I know it more than I did when I was more-or-less babelfishing longhand.) At one point I really did list out all the possible translations the lexicon gave for a given word, along with the possible cases it could be taking, and “translated” by trying to find a combination that looked like a sentence that might actually be what I was supposed to arrive at, brute-forcing my way through combinations until I was satisfied I’d hit upon a plausible stopping-point.

Now, it is fair to say that this amateurish butchering of a text isn’t much of a “reading”. But it’s not nothing. And it’s clearly not how anyone reads a text in everyday life, even if they’re reading Miss Malaprop, or puns, or double entendres. But it’s a procedure that would work for chess notation, and doesn’t give total nonsense when applied to natural language. “In/By/With beginning/start/origin/extremity/"corners of a sail"/"first place"/angel/demon(all dative) was/happened/existed the speech/word/reason/relation/discourse/cause/ground/account/"Word (of God)/"the mental faculty of calculating/thinking/reasoning""(all nominative) is something with some sort of similarity to “In the beginning was the Word”, though it’s hardly anything that a reasonable person (such as my Greek professor) would accept as a translation of “en archh hn o logos”.

By Daniel on 10/24/07 at 04:18 PM | Permanent link to this comment

but you say that you ‘brewed up’ the second lorem ipsum passage.  Did you, though?  Aren’t you actually quoting it?

You say you “brewed up” this coffee, but didn’t the machine actually brew it?  Didn’t you just push some buttons on the machine and then pour it into the cup?

Note that, in this nation of savages, at least, typographers could take perfectly good Latin for their dummy texts.  It’s not as if more than one person in five hundred would be able to attend to anything more than how it appeared as text.

By ben wolfson on 10/24/07 at 05:05 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 231 = LOREM IPSUM = MEMOIR PLUS.

By on 10/24/07 at 06:19 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 289 = CAN YOU RAED TIHS? = CAN YOU READ THIS?

By on 10/24/07 at 06:57 PM | Permanent link to this comment

’Davis: Why would the three levels “refute” one another?’

No reason at all. That was my point. John wrote that their differences presented a problem ("The problem with 2) and 3) is that they hardly come to the same thing"), whereas I don’t see anything problematic.

My current revised guess is that John meant “the problem _for Millikan’s and Currie’s account_”, in which case I was arguing with them instead of with him, but I confess to feeling pretty muddled by now. Maybe the real reason Socrates didn’t like writing is that it makes the dialogs too crowded?

By Ray Davis on 10/24/07 at 07:05 PM | Permanent link to this comment

"1), 2), and 3) don’t come to the same thing, but that doesn’t mean they refute each other. In the world as I know it, they all seem to exist in various forms.”

Yep, that’s the shape of the elephant alright.

By John Holbo on 10/24/07 at 07:09 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 247 = ELEPHANT SHAPE = ONE-TWO-THREE = PRESS TO MECO = THREE OF DISKS.

AQ 255 = LORD OF WORKS (AQ-187 SPENAMINO) = SYMBOLOGIST = ZOROASTRIAN.

AQ 266 = SPENTA MAINYU = THE ELEPHANT-GOD.

By on 10/24/07 at 09:11 PM | Permanent link to this comment

My comment above was actually written before Daniel’s, but without being logged in.  I am not ganging up on Adam.

By ben wolfson on 10/24/07 at 09:13 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 320 = INTENTIONAL FRAME = LINGUISTIC SHIFT = POTENT WORD-IMAGE = PRECLUDE EACH OTHER = WORD-ASSOCIATION.

AQ 423 = INTENTIONAL FRAMEWORK = OSCILLATION FREQUENCY = PASSIVE/ACTIVE COUPLET = RELAXATION OSCILLATOR.

AQ 367 = COUPLED OSCILLATION = SACRED WHITE ELEPHANT = THE LORD OF ILLUSION = VANGELO DELLE STREGHE.

AQ 381 = COUPLED OSCILLATORS = APPEARANCE OF PHENOMENA = CONSTRUCTED LANGUAGE = DEOXYRIBONUCLEIC ACID = DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS = HARMONIC OSCILLATION = HUE, RAINBOW OF COLORS = HYLETIC PROTENTION = LEARNABILITY THEORY = LIMITED INCORPORATED = MODAL CHARACTERISTICS = NEW WAVE OF CONQUEST = NO SIDE GAINS OR LOSES = PSYCHOLINGUISTICS = SYMBOLIC REPLACEMENT = THE CHIEF CORNERSTONE = THE CREATIVE VIRTUAL = THE TENTH ENOCHIAN KEY.

By on 10/24/07 at 09:37 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 295 = PENDULUM CLOCKS = ANTHERAEA PERNYI = DUMBLEDORE IS GAY! = HODOS CHAMELONIS = IRIDESCENT EFFECT = STS-120 MAIN THESIS = THE MISSING LINK = VIALE MONTEROSA (International Monopoly - Italy (Milan); corresponds to Vermont Avenue in US version) = WITHOUT ACTION (AQ-126 = WU WEI = MARACLEA).

My earlier arguments were developed using the concept of coupled oscillators. The phenomenon was first reported by the Dutch physicist Christian Huygens in the seventeenth century (Klarreich 2002). He noticed that pairs of pendulum clocks mounted to the same wall would, over time, become synchronized as they influenced one another through vibrations in the wall on which they were. In this case we have a purely physical system in which the coupling is direct and completely mechanical.

By on 10/24/07 at 09:54 PM | Permanent link to this comment

OK, a trillion monkey brains in a trillion bottles at the wheel of a trillion trolleycars for a trillion years finally write “lorum ipsem” without even using a typewriter. I got that part. Refresh me on what come next.

By John Emerson on 10/25/07 at 12:26 AM | Permanent link to this comment

Did I miss something? What is this bullshit? Is Paul Laffoley commenting here now?

By Jonathan Goodwin on 10/25/07 at 01:04 AM | Permanent link to this comment

"OK, a trillion monkey brains in a trillion bottles at the wheel of a trillion trolleycars for a trillion years finally write “lorum ipsem” without even using a typewriter. I got that part. Refresh me on what come next.”

Fight to the death between Swampman and the Omniscient Interpreter. I think it ends with one of them becoming a bondsman, but it’s been a while since I read “Giant-Sized Radical Interpretation Essay #12”.

northanger seemed to be posting anagrams and the like for a while, but he seems to have swerved into pure randomness now. On the other hand, “THE TENTH ENOCHIAN KEY”? Badass. This is my kind of nonsense-spam. God bless ye, northanger.

(is it “north anger” or “nort hanger”? I keep reading it as the latter, but I don’t know what a “nort” is. Maybe NORT is what produces the mysterious AQ numbers: Numbers Of Random Things. AQ could be “Awesome Quotient”. NORT Hanger, you are the best commenter ever.)

By Daniel on 10/25/07 at 04:25 PM | Permanent link to this comment

He [?] had me at “HYLETIC PROTENTION”.  Yowzah.

By Dave Maier on 10/25/07 at 05:12 PM | Permanent link to this comment

AQ 262 = NONSENSE-SPAM = GUARDED WELCOME.

Northanger Abbey, however...

AQ 444 = NUMBERS OF RANDOM THINGS = CURIOUS… VERY CURIOUS… (AQ-251 MR. OLLIVANDER) = LUCKY ELEPHANT-GOD OF INDIA.

He [?] = She {gwendolyn}

By on 10/26/07 at 02:35 AM | Permanent link to this comment

I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists have supposed.

Without knowing the specifics of the views Davidson is opposing, this sentence still made intuitive sense to me.

By Adam Kotsko on 10/26/07 at 02:28 PM | Permanent link to this comment

He [?] = She {gwendolyn davidson}

imho, this post is a hoot

By on 10/26/07 at 03:16 PM | Permanent link to this comment

Why does this matter?

I’m rather masochistically trying to answer that question. It seems to me that the non-self-identity of a fictional text has been pretty well accepted, has something to do with freeplay of signifiers, blah blah Frenchy French blah.

And if this God did not exist, the reader should be obliged to invent Him.

This seems like a totally satisfactory answer to the problem you’re posing--and may even be an effect of writing as a technology. Can’t we just say that in the process of reading, the reader posits a presence, and call it a day? As long as we’re aware that said presence may say different things to different people? And that said presence may be imagined before one even starts a book? Thus “Anne Radcliffe” will signify differently from “Jane Austen” as distinct author-functions, having been produced by distinct collective assemblages of enunciation (as they say).

</barking up the wrong blog>

By on 10/27/07 at 06:32 PM | Permanent link to this comment

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